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FLACSO – Latin American
Trade Network
This article sets out to describe the main features of the new
farm legislation in the United States, assess the extent to
which it conforms to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules,
and provide a preliminary assessment of its impact on Latin
America. The article first looks at the new United States
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, identifying
the different mechanisms used to support the country’s farm
producers. It then analyses that Act, referred to hereinafter
as the 2002 Farm Act, in the light of the rules established
and the commitments made in the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This is
followed by an analysis of the possible impact of the new
law on Latin American agriculture. Lastly, reference is made
to recent developments in multilateral trade negotiations and
the way they relate to the 2002 Farm Act.
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The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), held in Cancun, Mexico, from 10
to 14 September 2003 as part of the current Doha Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, brought to light the
intentions of the United States Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002 and showed that the United
States was seeking to legitimize its arsenal of subsidies
in the current round. At Cancun, the multilateral trade
negotiations collapsed when agreement could not be
reached on agriculture, owing to the defence of
protectionist structures by the developed countries. The
2002 Farm Act represented a U-turn, with the United
States moving from the liberalization camp to the
protectionist camp.
The main characteristic of the subsidy regime
enshrined in the 2002 Farm Act is its countercyclical
nature, resulting in overproduction of commodities.
This drives down prices and leads to surpluses of these
products on the world market. The consequences of
implementing the Act, however, go beyond the
continuation of farm support programmes. By updating
programme payment acreages and yields, the new rules
have changed the nature of direct government
payments, making them “recoupled” rather than
“decoupled”.1 This marks a backward step in relation
to the modest progress made in the Uruguay Round.
United States commodity spending is expected to
be between US$ 15 billion and US$ 20 billion a year
for crops alone, representing an increase of between
70% and 80% over the provisions of the Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996
(henceforth termed the 1996 Farm Act) in its last year
of operation. The total budget of the 2002 Farm Act
has been put at US$ 180 billion over the full
implementation period (six years). As a result, the
United States is likely to exceed the annual limit of
US$ 19.1 billion bound at WTO for the Aggregate
Measurement of Support (AMS).
While they differ in other respects, United States
farm policy and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
of the European Union both seek to create protection
systems capable of promoting and subsidizing their
producers in sophisticated and higher value-added
sectors.2 This being so, subsidy increases by one of these
two global players, and countermeasures by the other,
are extremely harmful to Latin American countries that
produce agricultural goods. Clearly, developing
countries are not operating on a level playing field.
The issue is one of vital importance, since among
the few measures available to developing countries to
counteract protectionist measures by the great powers
is their ability to bring in rules favourable to themselves
in the trade negotiations being conducted within the
framework of WTO. This being so, the 2002 Farm Act
can be seen as a strategic device to alter the
commitments accepted hitherto and change the ground




 Payments are classified as coupled or decoupled depending on the
effects that the subsidies concerned may have on production. If
payments are linked to the volume of production, they are considered
to be “coupled” because there is a direct relationship between the
sums disbursed and production levels. If payments do not affect the
volume of production, on the other hand, they are considered to be
“decoupled”.
2
 The value of farm gate output in the agricultural sectors of the
United States and the European Union is almost identical, at about
US$ 190 billion a year (OECD, 2001). The main indicator used by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) to measure internal support, the Total Support Indicator (TSE),
shows that in 2000 the United States spent US$ 92.3 billion
supporting agriculture, while the European Union spent US$ 10.5
billion. In per capita terms, United States farmers receive
approximately US$ 338 a year, while those of the European Union
receive US$ 276 (European Union, 2002).
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This law, termed the 2002 Farm Act in the present
article, regulates the payments that the United States
Government will make to support its farm producers
in the period 2002-2007, laying down the amounts and
access conditions for the different programmes. The
first three titles of the Act (I. Commodity programmes,
II. Conservation, and III. Trade) are the core of the
support programmes for United States farmers that will
have the greatest impact on agriculture in Latin
America: programmes of direct payments,
countercyclical payments, Marketing Assistance Loans
and LDPs (loan deficiency payments)3 in lieu of such
loans, conservation programmes and export support
programmes.
1. Commodity programmes
The 2002 Farm Act treats the following as
commodities: wheat, maize, sorghum, oats, barley,
upland cotton, rice and soybeans and other oilseeds.4
Income subsidies for commodity producers are
provided mainly through the Direct Payment Program,
the Counter-cyclical Payment Program and various
marketing programmes.
a) The Direct Payment Program
Under this new programme, farmers receive direct
subsidies from the Government. The Direct Payment
Program replaces the Production Flexibility Contracts
(PFC) programme, better known as AMTA (Agricultural
Market Transition Act) payments, which existed under
the 1996 Farm Act. AMTA payments were available for
growers of wheat, maize, barley, sorghum, oats, cotton
and rice. The 2002 Farm Act includes direct payments
for these commodities, and also covers peanuts,
soybeans and other oilseeds.
To receive assistance for crops covered by the
Direct Payment Program, producers sign annual
agreements for the period 2002-2007. How much they
receive is calculated from a formula that includes: a
payment rate (subsidy) per unit that is granted for each
crop, 85% of the acreage registered by the producer,
and a pre-set yield per crop for each farm. Thus, direct
payment = (commodity payment rate) x (acreage x 0.85)
x (pre-set yield).
When enrolling in these programmes, farmers have
to choose between two methods for determining
growing acreage. The new feature of this system is that
before the 2002 Farm Act was passed, producers
received direct payments calculated on the basis of the
acreage planted as of the mid-1990s and the yields
obtained in the 1980s. The 2002 Farm Act allows
updating to 1998-2001 acreages for the calculation of
direct payments. This adjustment is obviously going to
increase budgetary costs substantially.
Aside from certain limitations on the planting of
fruit and vegetables, producers are free to choose what
crops they grow. For their part, they have to maintain
the land given over to “farming” (growing, harvesting,
grazing, prevention of soil erosion, etc.) and comply
with rules relating to conservation of soil and the
environment.
One important difference between the 2002 Farm
Act and the 1996 Farm Act is that the latter placed
II
The United States Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act (Public Law 107-171)
3
 See section II, paragraph 1.d), for more details about LDPs.
4
 The term “other oilseeds” includes sunflower, canola, mustard or
any other kind of seeds as determined by the United States Secretary
of Agriculture.
TABLE 1
United States: Direct payment rate







Upland cotton Pound 0.0667
Rice Hundredweight 2.35
Soybeans Bushel 0.44
Other oilseeds Pound 0.008
Peanuts Ton 36.00
Source: United States Department of Agriculture.
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annual limits on direct payment amounts, while the new
law does not. Direct payments fell from US$ 5.57
billion in 1996 to US$ 4 billion in 2002. Some 85% of
these annual amounts were split among wheat (26%),
maize (46%) and cotton (12%). The 2002 Farm Act,
on the other hand, sets specific amounts per unit of
output. Consequently, there is no longer any ceiling on
total annual assistance; rather, the amount depends on
how much is produced.5 These direct payments give
growers of particular crops 10% to 20% additional
income, on average, over and above market prices.
Another essential difference between the two laws
is that under the 1996 Farm Act, AMTA payments were
set only for output in the base years, and calculation
rates were fixed for each crop. The 2002 Farm Act
allows the base acreage qualifying for the programme
to be updated using a four-year average (1998 to 2001)
for the planted acreage. By contrast with AMTA
payments, in short, the new subsidies provided by the
Direct Payment Program do not decrease over time,
are higher than the previous payments, and are tied to
acreage.
b) Counter-cyclical (or Counter-seasonal) Payments
Program
This new programme was designed to give farmers
a better income safety net, the idea being to replace the
emergency payments authorized by Congress from
1998 to 2001, which totalled from US$ 2.9 billion to
US$ 5.5 billion a year. Countercyclical payments are
made whenever the actual price of products is lower
than a target price pre-established by the Government.
The actual price is calculated using the following
formula:
Actual price = (1) + (2)
where:
(1) is the higher of a or b:
a is the average price over the last 12 months;
b is the average commodity national loan rate for
Marketing Assistance Loans, and
(2) is the direct payment rate (table 1).
The target price is the price per bushel or pound at
which the Government lends money to producers
participating in support programmes. Farmers can take
out a loan for all (or some) of their latest crop at any
time from harvesting until the following March or May,
depending on the crop.
For most of the products included in the assistance
programme, the 1996 Farm Act stipulated that loan rates
had to be equivalent to at least 85% of the average price
for the previous five years, with maximum prices for
some products (Basco, 2002). The 2002 Farm Act sets
lending rates for 2002-2003 and 2004-2007, those for
the latter period being slightly lower. For the
commodities included (other than soybeans), the new
rates are higher than the maximums authorized in the
previous legislation. The most significant change in this
policy instrument is the creation of fixed lending rates
instead of variable rates based on the price averages of
previous years.
Countercyclical payments are arrived at by
comparing the highest actual price (calculated by one
of the two methods described) with the target price set
by the Government. Once this comparison has been
made to determine whether or not a payment is due to
producers, countercyclical payment amounts are
calculated in much the same way as direct payments.
The variables used are 85% of the growing acreage
registered by the producer, the yield per commodity of
each agricultural establishment or farm, and a
countercyclical payment rate. The acreage is calculated
using the same two methods as for direct payments; in
turn, the yield per crop can be updated in three different
ways, including re-rating of yields qualifying for
inclusion up to 93.5% of 1998-2001 yields. The
resulting formula is:
Countercyclical payment = (countercyclical
payment rate) x (growing acreage x 0.85) x
(pre-established yield)
where the countercyclical payment rate = (target price)
- (payment rate) - (the higher of a, the average price
over the last 12 months, or b, the loan rate).
TABLE 2
United States: Target prices
(Dollars)
Commodity Unit 2002-2003 2004-2007
Wheat Bushel 3.86 3.92
Maize Bushel 2.60 2.63
Sorghum Bushel 2.54 2.57
Barley Bushel 3.21 2.24
Oats Bushel 1.40 1.44
Upland cotton Pound 0.724 0.724
Rice Hundredweight 10.50 10.50
Soybeans Bushel 5.80 5.80
Other oilseeds Pound 0.098 0.101
Peanuts Ton 495.00 495.00
Source: United States Department of Agriculture.5 See United States Department of Agriculture, www.usda.gov.
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Target prices are true support prices in that they
guarantee producers a minimum income irrespective
of fluctuations in market prices. This new policy almost
completely insulates United States producers from
market signals and represents a step back in United
States farm policy from the liberalization process begun
by the Government. Given the rise in yields over recent
years, particularly for certain products, these payments
will increase disproportionately.
c) Marketing assistance loans and payments in lieu
The United States Government offers a range of
non-recourse loans to farm producers, repayable after
nine months. The 2002 Farm Act gives continuity to these
programmes, widens the range of commodities covered
and does away with the requirement for an annual direct
payment agreement to have been signed as a precondition
for receiving the loan. Loans granted to commodity
producers can be repaid in three ways: i) by paying off
the loan at a set rate plus the interest established by the
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC); ii) by transferring
the crops grown to the Government, or iii) by paying off
the loan at an alternative rate.
Marketing assistance loans enable producers to pay
off non-recourse commodity loans at a rate lower than
the original one, provided that world prices for the
commodity concerned are lower than the initial payment
rate plus interest; the idea behind this is for the
Government to avoid an excessive build-up of stocks.
When world prices for the commodity in question
are lower than the initial payment rate plus interest for
the non-recourse loans granted, farm producers have
an alternative: the Secretary of Agriculture is entitled
to make discretionary payments directly to farmers who
undertake not to apply for non-recourse commodity
loans. Known as loan deficiency payments or LDPs,
these are calculated by multiplying the payment rate of
the marketing loan by the amount of the commodity
qualifying for lending. In this way, the farmer does not
take on the risk of a marketing loan. LDPs are
countercyclical by their very nature, since more is paid
out in price subsidies when prices are low and less when
they are high.
Marketing assistance loans and LDPs are designed
to keep potential credit arrears to a minimum and
prevent the Government from having to build up
commodity stocks. The 2002 Farm Act adds peanuts,
wool, mohair, honey, chickpeas, lentils and peas to the
products eligible for this type of loan (which are wheat,
maize, sorghum, cotton, rice, barley, soybeans and other
oilseeds).
d) Support programmes by sector and product
This section will describe different forms of
assistance for producers of dairy products, peanuts,
sugar, wool, angora, honey, chickpeas, lentils, apples,
fruit and vegetables.
i) Dairy products. The 2002 Farm Act extends
application of the government procurement programme
and export incentive programme for dairy products,
dismantles the North-East Dairy Compact programme
(giving special treatment to the New England region)
and sets up a new programme of payments for
commodity marketing losses, known as dairy market
loss payments, to replace the emergency payments
authorized by Congress (market loss assistance) and
made to dairy producers in 1999, 2000 and 2001.
The government procurement programme
authorizes the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
to purchase butter, powdered skimmed milk and cheese
at a pre-set minimum price. The prices set by the 1996
Farm Act were to decrease from 1996 until 1999, when
they were to be done away with. The promise to abolish
these price supports was not kept and the pre-set prices
were extended until 31 May 2002. The 2002 Farm Act
maintains these prices at their 1999 level and does not
provide for any reduction until 2007.
Under the Dairy Market Loss Payment programme
already alluded to, producers receive direct monthly
payments whenever the monthly price of milk generally,
skimmed milk, low-fat milk, etc. (Class 1 products
according to federal marketing orders)6 falls below
US$ 16.94 per hundredweight. Payments are limited
to 2.4 million pounds of milk per organization per year,
and the number of producers benefiting from these
operations does not affect the scope of this limitation.
The Dairy Export Incentive Program (one of the
export support programmes analysed further on)
subsidizes exports of United States dairy products by
means of bidding-based payments to companies selling
dairy products for export. It specifically provides that
the Secretary of Agriculture must authorize enough
subsidies to achieve the maximum dairy export volumes
permitted under the GATT Uruguay Round
commitments. This programme is used for market
6
 Federal marketing orders for dairy products were designed to help
establish and maintain clear, orderly marketing conditions. These
provisions establish a pricing system whereby prices are classified
and set according to the products milk is used for. Class 1 is the first
step in an 11-category classification.
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development purposes and was extended until 2007 by
the 2002 Farm Act.
ii) Peanuts. The peanut price support programme
is abolished and replaced by a system of direct
payments, countercyclical payments and marketing
loans much like the programmes for other commodities.
The internal peanut marketing quota applied under the
1996 Farm Act is abolished and quota holders are
compensated through a quota repurchase system. Under
this new system, peanut growers have the same rights
of access to government support programmes.
iii) Sugar. Before 1996, the sugar programme had
to be administered on a no net cost basis. This no net
cost condition meant that the CCC was debarred from
building up stocks of sugar acquired under commodity
assistance programmes. This requirement was met by
adjusting import quotas or setting internal marketing
allotments. The 1996 Farm Act did not include the no
net cost condition and authority to set marketing
allotments was not renewed. The 2002 Farm Act
restored the mechanism, to prevent stocks built up under
non-recourse loan programmes being diverted to the
Government; it authorizes the non-recourse loan
programme until 2007 (18 cents per pound of unrefined
cane sugar and 22.9 cents per pound of refined beet
sugar), and abolishes sugar marketing payments, along
with the penalties for crop diversion.
Similarly, the 2002 Farm Act reintroduces a supply
control system that was abolished by the 1996 Farm
Act: the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to set
market quotas in order to balance out supply and
demand, prevent products being diverted into
government stocks and comply with sugar import
commitments. The new law also creates a loan
programme to facilitate sugar storage, which provides
cane and beet sugar processors with financing to build
or improve storage facilities.
The payment in kind (PIK) programme continues.
This programme gives beet sugar producers the option
of swapping part of their crop for sugar held in CCC
stocks.
The sugar import quota is maintained, restricting
imports of this product to support the domestic price.
The quota is 1.23 million tons of raw cane sugar and
24,250 tons of refined sugar.
iv) Wool, angora, honey, chickpeas and lentils.
These commodities, which were not supported by the
1996 Farm Act (except by ad hoc payments) have a
guaranteed level of support under the 2002 Farm Act
through Marketing Assistance Loans and LDPs. The
number of products supported directly by the
Government has thus increased, and the possibility of
new products being included in the near future has been
established.
v) Apples, fruit and vegetables. The 2002 Farm
Act includes US$ 100 million of subsidies for apple
producers, supposedly to compensate for low prices in
2000, and over US$ 200 million in additional funding
to purchase and distribute fruit and vegetables under
various programmes.
e) Maximum limits on commodity programme
payments
For direct payments, the limit has been kept at
US$ 40,000 per person. For counter-cyclical payments,
the limit is US$ 65,000. Marketing loan payments have
a maximum of US$ 75,000. Producers whose gross
revenues average more than US$ 2.5 million over three
years will be entitled to payments only if 75% of these
revenues are from agriculture.
The 2002 Farm Act keeps the three-entity rule,
whereby an individual farmer who owns three farms
or agricultural establishments can receive a full direct
annual payment for the first farm and half-payment for
each of the others. In other words, the farmer may
receive up to twice the total annual payment in the form
of contract and marketing loan profit payments for three
separate farms (one full payment for the first operation
and up to half for each of the other two).
Although the 2002 Farm Act contains measures to
limit subsidies under specific programmes to a total of
US$ 360,000 per agricultural establishment or farm, a
range of exceptions in the Act may have the effect of
nullifying this limit. By means of crop loan certificates,
for example, farmers who have taken out non-recourse
loans for the largest amounts and have had to hand over
their crops as payment can purchase these certificates
from the CCC at a rate lower than the original rate plus
interest on the loan they took out, and then swap them
for the crops delivered as surety. In this way, big
producers recover their crops and pay off their loans at
a lower rate. With provisions like this, the many
payments provided for by the 2002 Farm Act are going
to benefit large producers rather than the small farmers
at whom this law is supposedly aimed.
f) The cost of commodity subsidies
Early estimates put the cost of direct subsidies and
countercyclical payments at between US$ 11 billion
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and US$ 12 billion a year. Payments made under the
loan programme in 1999-2001 have totalled between
US$ 6 billion and US$ 8 billion, and if prices were to
hold steady then spending would be similar in the
coming years. Payments are expected to increase,
however, because the 2002 Farm Act will hasten the
fall in the prices of the affected products.
Thus, it is estimated that annual commodity
spending will reach between US$ 15 billion and
US$ 20 billion a year for crops alone. This represents a
rise of 70% (other preliminary estimates put it as high
as 80%) over the stipulations of the 1996 Farm Act in
its last year of operation (European Union, 2002).
2. Conservation programmes
Land and natural resource conservation programmes
have existed since the 1930s and are of great importance
in United States agricultural policy. As well as
promoting environmental values, payments linked to
the conservation of natural resources can act as
measures of support for agricultural production.
The 1996 Farm Act provided for a number of
conservation programmes, among them the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the Wetlands
Reserve Program (WRP) and the Environmental Quality
Incentives Program (EQIP). In its conservation title, the
2002 Farm Act maintains existing programmes and
creates a new one, the Conservation Security Program
(CSP), which offers producers incentives to adopt or
maintain a range of structural management practices
targeted on one or more resources of interest, such as
soil, water and wildlife. This title provides for an 80%
increase in the funding hitherto assigned to
environmental and conservation programmes, bringing
the combined total to US$ 17.1 billion.
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) entails
annual payments by the Government and a cost sharing
system. Owners of farmland sign 10 to 15-year contracts
in which they agree to retire cropland and establish long-
term land cover (such as trees or grass) in exchange for
annual payments. When this programme began its main
objective was to reduce erosion, but the 1990 Farm Act
extended its environmental objectives to water quality
and wildlife. Annual disbursements during the 1990s
averaged US$ 1.5 billion. The land included varied from
30 to 36 million acres and there was a ceiling of 36.4
million acres, representing about an eighth of all land
suitable for commodity growing. The 2002 Farm Act
increased the maximum coverage of this programme
to 39.2 million acres and changed the qualifying criteria.
The Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) is based on
a system of State purchases and of cost sharing and
payment facilities as incentives to bring producers into
the programme. The 1996 Farm Act authorized the
payment of US$ 1.3 billion over a seven-year period to
help farmers and ranchers carry out environmental
improvements and conservation work on their
properties; the maximum land area covered by the
programme was 1.075 million acres. The 2002 Farm
Act increases this to 2.275 million acres, with a
maximum annual enrolment of 250,000 acres.
The Environmental Quality Incentives Program
(EQIP) offers technical assistance, cost sharing and
financial incentives to help farmers and ranchers adopt
and implement environmental improvements and
conservation measures in their establishments. The
1996 Farm Act authorized up to US$ 1.3 billion for the
seven years of the implementation period. The 2002
Farm Act significantly increases the funding for this
programme, as it provides for a gradual increase from
US$ 400 million to US$ 1.3 billion for the period 2002-
2007.
3. Export support programmes
Products from Latin American countries often have
to compete with United States goods in both domestic
and export markets. The support programmes run by
the United States for its own exports facilitate the
country’s export operations abroad by means of special
incentives and credit facilities for potential buyers and
infrastructure abroad for storing United States farm
produce. The United States Government operates a
number of export assistance programmes: the Export
Enhancement Program, the Dairy Export Incentive
Program, the Market Access Program, the Foreign
Market Development Cooperator Program and the
Emerging Markets Program. Meanwhile, the United
States Department of Agriculture runs four export
credit guarantee programmes: i) the CCC-run short-
term Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-102),
which is the largest export promotion programme in
the United States; ii) the intermediate-term Export
Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-103); iii) the
Supplier Credit Guarantee Program, and iv) the Credit
Guarantee Programme for infrastructure. The
provisions of the 2002 Farm Act affect the different
United States export assistance programmes as
follows:
— The 1996 Farm Act allocated an annual minimum
of US$ 5.5 billion to the GSM-102 and GSM-103
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programmes and specified the minimum proportion
of credit guarantees that had to be used for high-
value processed products: 25% in 1996 and 1997,
30% in 1998 and 1999, and 35% thereafter. The
2002 Farm Act keeps these provisions, so that no
less than 35% of guarantees have to be used for
products of this type.
— The term of short-term credits granted under the
Supplier Credit Guarantee Program is extended by
the 2002 Farm Act from 180 to 360 days, with a
view to encouraging United States exporters to
expand, maintain and develop markets for their
country’s export products in areas where
commercial financing may not be available without
a CCC payment guarantee.
— The 2002 Farm Act provides for US$ 1 billion to
go to direct credit or credit guarantee programmes
for exports to emerging markets, the aim being to
provide facilities and services or supply United
States products to improve transport, handling,
marketing, processing, storage or distribution
conditions for United States farm products in the
markets identified.
— The United States supplies food aid through the
Food for Progress programme (Public Law 480).
The 2002 Farm Act allows the programme to be
extended until 2007. It also includes conflict
prevention as an objective and raises minimum
assistance levels from 1.875 billion to 2.5 billion
metric tons a year, among other provisions.
— As well as modifying existing programmes, the
2002 Farm Act establishes new programmes with
the aim of eliminating, resolving or mitigating
sanitary and phytosanitary barriers and other
technical obstacles to trade:
• The Biotechnology and Agricultural Trade
Program deals with non-tariff regulatory
barriers to United States commodity exports. It
authorizes donations for public-sector and
private-sector projects concerned with
biotechnology, food safety, diseases or other
sanitary and phytosanitary issues.
• The Technical Assistance for Specialty Crops
Program helps exporters overcome particular
barriers that prevent or jeopardize exports of
specialized products from the United States, by
means of public- and private-sector projects and
technical assistance to deal with delicate
strategic issues of market retention, access and
expansion. The amount made available for this
is US$ 19 million.
The new feature of the 2002 Farm Act where
export support programmes are concerned is the
requirement for the United States Agriculture
Secretary and Trade Representative to consult
regularly with Senate and House of Representatives
committees on negotiations over export credit
guarantee programmes for farm produce that are
conducted in WTO and the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD). If the United
States and other OECD countries have so far been
unable to commit themselves to minimum restraints
on the use of government-guaranteed export credits
and export subsidies, this new consultation mechanism
is going to make it considerably harder to achieve,
even if the United States makes an ambitious proposal
at WTO to dismantle such credits.
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1. Agricultural assistance measures and their
classification by WTO
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture7 places internal
measures of assistance for the production and
marketing of farm produce in three “compartments”:
“amber box” measures, “green box” measures and
“blue box” measures. These “compartments”, which
embody the general rules for subsidy use in
agriculture, are of the greatest importance for
understanding the nature of the new programmes
included in the 2002 Farm Act.
— Amber box measures are those considered trade-
distorting. They include, among others, support
prices, direct payments that affect output volume
(“coupled payments”) and input and capital
subsidies. These measures are subject to progressive
reductions and periodic review, and are the ones
taken into account to calculate the Aggregate
Measurement of Support (AMS).
— Green box measures are those that do not involve
direct payments to producers, have little or no effect
on output and trade, do not increase market prices,
and have to be financed out of the public budget.
These measures are identified as “decoupled
payments” and are exempt from reduction
commitments.
— Blue box measures are direct payments made under
output limitation programmes based on fixed
acreages and yields, apply to 85% or less of the
base output level and, in the case of livestock
payments, are made for a fixed number of head.
These payments are exempt from AMS reduction
commitments.
— The de minimis clause is an exception to the amber
box reductions. It states that small-scale subsidies
do not have to be reduced or abolished. Assistance
for specific products must not exceed 5% of the total
output value of the product in the case of developed
countries or 10% in the case of developing ones.
Internal assistance that is not product-specific must
not exceed 5% of total agricultural output by value
in the case of developed countries or 10% in the
case of developing ones.
A key condition for classifying subsidies is whether
or not payments to producers are decoupled, i.e.,
whether or not they are independent of output, domestic
and external prices and input use. Insofar as these
payments are pre-set and do not vary with output or
market conditions, the relationship between support and
production is broken. To put it another way, output
would be virtually the same with or without these
payments. Consequently, such decoupled payments are
said to be “minimally distorting”.
Underlying the idea of decoupled payments and
their relatively undistorting effects is the fact that
freedom to plant and choose among crops year by year
reduces the distortions that arise when subsidies are
based on a particular crop. If all support to agriculture
were decoupled, farmers would respond to marginal
price changes in world markets and would thus produce
the same as they would have done had there been no
market intervention. Where payments are not tied to
any of the main variables influencing production
decisions, farmers will invest their money in the
activities that offer the highest returns. But the most
important thing in judging whether so-called decoupled
payments are market-distorting or not is to ascertain
whether this assistance encourages farmers to plant a
larger acreage or produce more with the aim of receiving
greater benefits from the government in future.
Depending on whether or not payments qualify as
decoupled, subsidies are classified in the different
compartments and the regimes they should follow are
determined. If payments are coupled to some variable
that affects the volume of production and do not comply
with “blue box” rules, they belong in the “amber box”
and are thus subject to the limits established by the
Aggregate Measurement of Support and to reduction
commitments. Conversely, coupled payments that do
meet the “blue box” provisions classify as exceptions
and are exempt from the reduction commitments.
Where payments are decoupled, they belong in the
III
The 2002 Farm Act and
WTO provisions
7
 See GATT (1994).
146 C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 1  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 3
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHIFT IN  UNITED STATES FARM POLICY •  CARLOS BASCO,  IVAN BUCCELLATO,
VALENTINA DELICH,  D IANA TUSSIE
“green box” and are not subject to AMS limitations or
reduction commitments.
2. Classifying direct payment programmes
Being coupled, direct payments rightly belong in the
amber box and should count towards AMS
commitments, i.e., towards the annual farm support
spending limit to which the United States has committed
itself at WTO.
In 1996, LDPs were replaced by the decoupled
payments established by the AMTA. This seemed to be
the beginning of a commitment by the United States to
move away from the highly coupled nature of the
traditional farm income support programmes created
since the 1930s. When AMTA payments were introduced
in 1996, they seemed to be quite closely attuned to the
requirements for decoupled payments. They were
applied on the basis of fixed acreages and yields
corresponding to pre-1996 averages, they did not vary
with changes in output, prices or input use, and farmers
were not required to have grown any crop previously
to receive them. The United States reported them to
WTO as decoupled payments.
Until 2001, payments classified as decoupled met
clearly defined criteria based on pre-1996 acreages and
yields. The 2002 Farm Act, however, offers farmers
the option of updating these acreages and yields to
1998-2001 averages. Consequently, farmers who
planted more and/or cultivated their land more
intensively from 1996 onward, in the expectation that
their lobbyists would be able to persuade Congress to
update the future payment basis and thus increase the
amount of their payments at a later date, succeeded in
achieving a permanent increase in their incomes from
decoupled payments.
3. Classifying countercyclical payment
programmes
According to the provisions of the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture, subsidies tied to product prices should
be in the amber box, and should count towards the upper
limits agreed at WTO. The sponsors of the 2002 Farm
Act maintain, however, that countercyclical subsidies
should not be set against the agreed maximum, but
against the de minimis subsidies permitted. They also
maintain that these subsidies are non-specific.
The de minimis clause, however, allows subsidies
not exceeding 5% of the output value of each crop
included in the payments to be exempted from the AMS
calculation. For payments that are not product-specific,
the exemption is based on the total value of agricultural
output. Given the high value of United States
agricultural production (some US$ 190 billion a year),
5% of this (about US$ 10 billion) is enough to cover
any kind of subsidy. Furthermore, the 2002 Farm Act
states that countercyclical payments are to be
determined by what was grown in the base year, which
means that they will reflect the price movements of
each crop included. It is clear that these payments are
product-specific and cannot be classified as non-
specific.
Again, approvals of emergency assistance
packages from 1998 to 2001 rose as prices fell. These
payments were distributed among farmers on the basis
of the same acreages and yields as were used for AMTA
payments. After a number of delays in submitting the
required notifications, and after lengthy discussions in
government, academia and producers’ organizations,
the United States Government began to notify these
additional payments to WTO as part of its AMS, i.e., as
being among the internal assistance measures deemed
market-distorting and thus subject to the agreed
reductions.
4. Is the 2002 Farm Act in breach of the Aggregate
Measurement of Support commitments?
The question of how different support programmes
should be classified is not a minor one, since the answer
determines whether the 2002 Farm Act conforms to the
limits agreed by the United States in the AMS. The AMS
is the annual level of assistance, expressed in monetary
terms, that is provided to an agricultural commodity or
to the producers of the base commodity, or the level of
non-product-specific assistance provided to farmers in
general. The AMS applies to all internal measures of
support, except those included in the green and blue
boxes and in the de minimis clause.
The most important thing is to know what is going
to happen to the AMS limit of US$ 19.1 billion a year to
which the United States committed itself in the Uruguay
Round. The total budget for the 2002 Farm Act has been
put at US$ 180 billion over the implementation period
(European Union, 2002). Given the obvious
discrepancy between the upper limit bound at WTO and
the expenditure anticipated, disbursements seem likely
to exceed the limit bound in the AMS. Some statements
made by the United States Department of Agriculture
also suggest, however, that there will be a heated debate
over how each expenditure item should be classified,
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to determine whether or not it should be counted in the
AMS.
To avoid problems, the 2002 Farm Act authorizes
the Agriculture Secretary to make adjustments
“insofar as this is feasible” to prevent WTO
commitments from being exceeded. One extreme
option should excessive disbursement occur is to
require farmers to return any portion of the payments
they have received that exceeds the limit, but this
would raise both operational problems and political
ones, given the strength of farmers’ objections.
Another option is simply to break the agreements and
then deal with the complaints of the country or
countries affected, which can be done through the
dispute settlement system, or to offer compensation
or find some other innovative way of reclassifying
the subsidies. A third possibility is that the United
States is not too worried about the long-term effects,
and that the 2002 Farm Act is in fact a strategic
negotiating device created with the intention of
altering existing commitments and changing the
ground rules of the current WTO negotiations.
As for the question of whether the 2002 Farm Act
is in breach of the rules agreed to within WTO, opinions
are divided. Hitherto there has been no formal
submission to WTO questioning the legality of the new
Act, although many delegations, including those of
Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay and Uruguay, have
expressed concern about its content and some
Governments (that of Brazil, for example) have
informed the press that they intend to begin
consultations within WTO (the first step in challenging
a measure under the dispute settlement system). The
matter can only be settled in the longer term, however,
once the annual results of the AMS calculation are
known.
IV
The impact of the 2002 Farm Act
on Latin American agriculture
The United States Farm Act of 2002 is a complex piece
of legislation, and this makes it difficult to evaluate
fully the economic and trade impact that it will have.
Even so, a preliminary attempt can be made to gauge
its possible implications for agriculture in the Latin
American countries.
1. The effects of certain support programmes
The United States exports about 25% of its agricultural
output, a figure that rises to as much as 40% for some
crops, such as wheat. LDPs and countercyclical
payments will lower the export prices of United States
products in receipt of them, so that they will be
subsidized when they reach world markets.
Countercyclical payments and LDPs guarantee
United States farmers a certain level of income.
Consequently, farmers pay less attention to market
signals, something that is particularly harmful at times
when prices are depressed. Because of the way these
payment mechanisms work, a fall in prices may mean
that farmers actually receive higher incomes than they
would have if market prices were higher. This can create
a disincentive to rein in overproduction. Because the
guaranteed income means an assured return on crops,
there is no reason whatsoever why United States farmers
should refrain from maximizing their output, or worry
about the prospects of fetching a good price for their
crop. The most likely outcome is that overproduction
will saturate the market and drive prices down, while
the incomes of United States farmers will be protected
by yet larger LDPs and countercyclical payments.
The central fact is that subsidies result in
overproduction, driving down prices and leading to a
kind of dumping of commodities on the world market.
According to preliminary estimates, international prices
might be driven down by some 5% to 8% by the 2002
Farm Act (Gardner, 2002). The kind of unfair
competition thus generated by the 2002 Farm Act entails
serious threats to farm producers, not only in Latin
America but in all countries involved in agriculture.
In fact, these support programmes not only result
in inefficient production, but encourage monopoly
practices. This is happening, for example, with grain
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and cotton producers. Of the more than 2 million farm
producers receiving government subsidies in the United
States, 10% account for 67% of the US$ 19 billion paid
out each year (Clarín, 2002). According to United States
statistics (United States Department of Agriculture,
2002), these big farmers have used government cheques
to enlarge their holdings by buying up neighbouring
farms and thus increase output. The business is still
profitable for them, because any shortfall is made up
by the Government.
Another consequence of the 2002 Farm Act is that,
by bringing down the price of commodities in the
domestic market, it provides the food processing
industry with cheap inputs. Beef, poultry, pork and
milk producers are a good example: cheaper fodder
increases their competitiveness in external markets or
discourages imports of these products from more
efficient countries. This forces marginal exporters to
withdraw from the market, whereupon subsidized
exports from the United States may well fill the gap.
By artificially lowering commodity prices in the
domestic market, the United States makes itself less
attractive to potential importers. The insulation of
United States producers from international market
signals thus comes full circle.
2. The impact by sector and country
— The products of greatest interest to the countries
in the region, such as sugar, citrus fruits, orange,
grapefruit and lemon juice, apples, vegetables in
general, peanuts, cotton and tobacco, are very
unlikely to be allowed greater access to the United
States market. The effects of the 2002 Farm Act
on imports and local output will vary from country
to country. In the case of wheat, the United States
will increase its competitiveness relative to
Argentina and Canada in all the markets of the
region. The new law also seems to be taking the
battle to Canada in the market for high-quality
wheat.
— United States subsidies for maize and sorghum will
particularly affect small local growers in the Latin
American countries, who are going to suffer from
their impact and find it hard to survive. The region’s
big producers will see their export revenues fall
and local consumers will benefit from the lower
prices. Soybean subsidies will mainly affect Brazil
and Argentina, whose export revenues will drop
because of lower prices.
— The new United States regulations will adversely
affect dairy production in all the Latin American
countries. Continuing and increased subsidies for
domestic production and export of dairy products
will depress international prices yet further. The
region’s less competitive producers are going to
find it hard to stay in business because the tariff
levels required for them to do so might exceed the
aggregate commitments accepted at WTO.
— Local poultry producers will be among the worst
affected. Cheaper food, and subsidies in general,
will increase the competitiveness of United States
poultry exports and this will force an adjustment
in local output, particularly in countries that retain
protection for maize and/or sorghum.
— Exports of United States prepared foods, such as




The United States Farm Act of 2002 has a number of
objectives, and these operate on two levels at once. On
the one hand, it represents an effort to bolster the
production capacity of the United States farm sector
and respond to pressure from traditional farming
lobbies. On the other, it is an attempt to change the
ground rules of the multilateral system governing
agriculture.
This paper has provided details of the support
programmes included in the Act that are likely to have
the greatest effect on the economies and markets of the
Latin American countries. It has sought to characterize
the new programmes established by the Act by
analysing WTO rules on internal support measures and
the classification of subsidies. In an effort to calculate
the impact the new United States farm support measures
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may have on Latin American agriculture, it has outlined
the long-term effects that might arise for the different
sectors and commodities in the Latin American
countries.
The 2002 Farm Act raises the number of protection
and assistance mechanisms for the United States
agricultural sector, and increases the sums provided for
by the 1996 Farm Act. It is very likely to insulate United
States farmers/agricultural producers from market
signals and depress international commodity prices. By
updating the acreages and yields used as the basis for
determining subsidy amounts, the new law changes the
payments made by the Government from “decoupled”
to “recoupled” ones. Given the characteristics of the
support mechanisms used, the funds that will have to
be disbursed under the 2002 Farm Act will probably
exceed the Aggregate Measurement of Support bound
by the United States at WTO.
Some recent events have borne out the initial fears
about the United States position on agricultural support
measures and their relationship with the 2002 Farm Act.
At the recent WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun,
corresponding to the Doha Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, the trade negotiations collapsed because
agreement could not be reached on agriculture.
The path taken by the United States in
implementing the 2002 Farm Act has revealed a position
very different from the official one of support for trade
liberalization. It even seems to be running counter to
the recent reforms made by the European Union to its
Common Agricultural Policy, the thrust of which was
to decouple payments to farmers and reduce blue box
measures, although green box ones increased. The
alliances which emerged during the agriculture
negotiations laid bare the protectionist position of the
United States. By contrast with the Uruguay Round,
where the main struggle in agriculture was between the
United States and the European Union over subsidy
cuts, in the current negotiations the United States and
the European Union submitted a joint negotiating
proposal. This proposal, which was quite far from the
original United States proposal, alerted developing
countries and obliged them to create a new alliance to
counter this position.
The failure of the Cancun Conference raises serious
doubts about the prospects for completing the Doha
Round in 2005, the date set for ending the negotiations.
This could represent both a threat and an opportunity
for the Latin American countries; what is absolutely
certain is that the 2002 Farm Act is a strategic device
to alter the commitments accepted and change the
ground rules in the current WTO negotiations. This being
so, the greatest concern, apart from the large sums set
aside for subsidies, has to be about the efforts to
reclassify assistance programmes at WTO in a way that
legitimizes the new United States support programmes.
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